Personal safety in stations and trains

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Summary

In the Netherlands personal safety in public transportation (aggression, violence, crime, nuisance, incivilities and anti-social behaviour) is a topic that has ranked high on the political agenda for some time now. Public safety in railway stations and trains also received significant attention, and a great deal of work was done through a collaborative effort on the part of the Ministries of Infrastructure and the Environment, of the Interior (BZK), and of Security and Justice (VenJ), Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), ProRail – together responsible for stations and trains - and the labour unions.

In March 2015 a train conductor was the victim of a serious violent incident, which led to the adoption of additional measures. These measures went beyond those introduced earlier and often aimed to speed up the implementation process.

In the first quarter of 2016 the DSP group, commissioned by the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry of Security and Justice, evaluated a package of measures using a ‘quickscan’: a study conducted in a short period of time to get a picture of what has been done and what the initial results are. Because the measures in this package have either only just recently been introduced or have yet to be (fully) implemented, the time between implementation and demonstrable results is limited, which is why it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the initial results and any effects the measures may have had on personal safety. But the study can tell us about the current status of the implementation process and about whether these measures can be expected to work (and how).

Quickscan

The main aim of the study was to gain insight into the current status as of February 2016 of the package of eight measures approved on 11 March 2015 by the parties mentioned above to improve personal safety in stations and trains for rail staff and – passengers.

The main questions° of the study:

1. What do the eight measures entail, what are the goals and what are expectations with respect to achieving them?
2. What is the current status of implementation of the eight measures?
3. How probable is it in practice that the various measures are having or have had an effect on (perceived) personal safety?
4. What developments in (perceived) personal safety can be detected in the past period?

Note1  WODC (VenJ) Project Initiation Document, 15-12-2015, project number 2692.
A number of different methods were employed to answer these questions:

- Analysis of data on incident records, from a staff perceived safety study and from the station and train surveys conducted on passengers.
- The study of parliamentary papers, policy programmes, internal documents and progress reports.
- A survey of published research, primarily Dutch.
- Interviews with a total of 30 individuals: policymakers who were involved in putting together the set of eight measures, key individuals involved in implementation at either the executive or organisational level, representatives of other parties involved, such as labour unions, and experts.

1.1 The measures

*What do these eight measures entail, what are the goals and what are expectations with respect to achieving them?*

The set of eight measures was drawn up in March 2015 with an aim to improve personal safety in stations and trains. The measures were swiftly adopted following a serious act of aggression in Hoofddorp.

The eight measures had for the most part already been adopted and implemented, but now their introduction was sped up. The eight measures go beyond a substantial number of existing measures targeting personal safety.

The eight measures are:

1. Extra support aboard the train on high-risk routes and at high-risk periods (doubled staffing).
2. (a) Increased camera surveillance and (b) Trial use of video monitors
3. On-board camera surveillance
4. Accelerated introduction of card-activated access gates
5. Intensified cooperation between NS and the police
6. Expedited introduction of station ban for prolific offenders
7. A zero tolerance approach for violations
8. Greater attention to care and assistance for troublemakers

The goal of the measures is to improve personal safety for both employees and passengers. Personal safety concerns both people’s perception of safety (perceived safety) and their objective safety: the chance that staff and/or passengers will fall victim to actual incidents (especially acts of aggression or violence).

The survey of the literature shows that, based on research, five of the eight measures could be expected to make a positive contribution: doubled staffing on high-risk routes and at high-risk times, camera surveillance in stations and on trains, card-activated access gates and improved cooperation between NS and the police. With respect to the remaining measures we found no contraindications, again based on research available.
We have summarised the measures in the following table. For each measure (column 1) we first list the goals and interim goals (column 2), followed by the presumed working mechanisms (column 3). The last column summarises the most important outcomes based on technical literature on the measure or related measures. The table provides a summary, as well as details and specific results. Detailed results per measure - in Dutch - can be found in chapters 4 through 11 of the research report.
Table 1.1 Overview by measure of goals and insights from technical literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Goals and subgoals</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Support in the literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Measure 1:** extra support aboard the train on high-risk routes and during high-risk periods (doubled staffing). | Improve the objective and perceived safety of employees  
  • More on-site support in emergency situations  
  • Deterring potential offenders | Doubled staffing provides increased on-site support in emergencies.  
  This increases employees’ objective safety. More support also makes employees feel safer, thus leading to increased employee perceived safety.  
  • Doubled staffing acts as a deterrent for potential offenders, resulting in fewer incidents. This increases employees’ objective safety. | Research shows that increased functional surveillance through doubled staffing increases the perceived likelihood of catching offenders, which may deter potential offenders. This means that the number of incidents can be expected to decrease and that objective safety will increase. Furthermore, applied proportionally, double staffing is expected to contribute to an improvement in perceived safety. |
| **Measure 2a:** increased camera surveillance in stations | Improve the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers  
  • Potential offenders are deterred  
  • Staff and passengers are aware of camera surveillance in use  
  • Better on-site direction of enforcement staff  
  • Offenders of incidents are tracked down and prosecuted | The awareness of the presence of cameras increases the perceived likelihood that offenders will be caught, acting as a deterrent.  
  • Staff and passengers feel safer when they are aware of ongoing camera surveillance.  
  • The ability to watch incidents as they unfold allows for improved direction of enforcement staff. In this way more offenders are caught and objective safety improves.  
  • The use of stored images results in offenders being tracked down and prosecuted, resulting in increased objective safety. | Research shows that cameras can have a preventative effect. The idea that images can be observed and recorded acts as a deterrent (only) on rational offenders (not impulsive ones). The literature does not give a clear picture concerning the effect that camera surveillance has on perceived safety. It seems safe to assume that live camera surveillance has a positive effect on safety. Theoretically, cameras are of great value for the subsequent tracking down offenders. |
| **Measure 2b:** trial use of video monitors (live in public showing CCTV footage) | Improve the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers  
  • Potential offenders are deterred  
  • Staff and passengers are aware of ongoing camera surveillance  
  • The access gates result in fewer fare-dodgers on the train  
  • Fewer non-passengers in the station  
  • Offenders of incidents are tracked down and prosecuted  
  • The access gates lead to fewer non-passengers in the station  
  • The use of stored images results in offenders being tracked down and prosecuted, resulting in increased objective safety. | Video monitors make potential offenders and troublemakers aware of ongoing camera surveillance. This causes them to think that their likelihood of being caught is greater, thus deterring them and making them less likely to cause incidents, and hence improving safety.  
  • Making video monitors visible makes staff and passengers aware of camera surveillance, which makes them feel safer. | Available research shows it is not likely that potential offenders will adapt their behaviour due to video monitors. Rational offenders were probably already aware there was camera surveillance, whereas impulsive offenders do not take risks into consideration and are thus not deterred by the presence of surveillance cameras. Published research does not give a clear picture concerning the influence that awareness of ongoing camera surveillance may have. |
| **Measure 3:** camera surveillance on trains | Improve objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers  
  • Offenders of incidents are tracked down and prosecuted  
  • Staff and passengers are aware of ongoing camera surveillance | Using stored images to investigate incidents allows offenders to be tracked down and pursued, thus making them less likely to cause incidents in the future. This results in increased objective safety.  
  • Staff and passengers feel safer when they are aware of ongoing camera surveillance. | Research shows that that cameras are quite valuable for the subsequent tracking down of offenders. The literature does not give a clear picture concerning the effect that camera surveillance has on perceived safety. |
| **Measure 4:** accelerated introduction of electronic card-activated access gates | Improve the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers  
  • Fewer fare-dodgers on the train  
  • Fewer non-passengers in the station | The access gates result in fewer fare-dodgers on the train. Since there are fewer fare-dodgers, fewer acts of aggression arise when fares are checked. This leads to improved objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers.  
  • The access gates lead to fewer non-passengers in the station. This results in fewer potential troublemakers in the station, making staff and passengers feel safer. | On the basis of published literature, the introduction of card-activated access gates is expected to have a positive effect on public safety in the train, but not necessarily around the access gates themselves. |
### Measure 5: intensified cooperation between NS and the police

- Improve the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers
- • Better information sharing between the police and NS at various levels
- • Promotes joint actions that are more targeted
- • Visible physical police presence
- • Improved reaction quality and reaction time of police interventions

- When consultation takes place at multiple levels, information is exchanged at each level, resulting in joint actions that are better targeted, which increases objective and perceived safety for staff and passengers.
- • When there is better information sharing, joint interventions can be better targeted, resulting in a decrease in registered incidents. When agents are deployed where they are needed, cooperation improves and interventions can be made more quickly. In this way objective and perceived safety improve for staff and passengers.
- • The visible presence of police officers has a preventative effect on potential offenders. The presence of police officers also makes visitors to the station feel safer. In this way the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers is increased.
- • When there is better information sharing, the police can intervene more quickly and effectively. A prompt and appropriate reaction deters offenders. In this way the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers is improved.

Research shows that a possible positive effect can be expected from targeted deployment and the deployment of area police officers. In theory, the hotspot/hot times approach works. The visible presence of officers can make a positive contribution to the sense of safety, although not in all situations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure 6: accelerated introduction of station ban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prolific offenders are deterred and adapt their behaviour in the station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prolific offenders stop coming to the station</td>
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</table>

- When prolific offenders can be banned from the station, they adapt their behaviour to avoid this. They will then cause less nuisance and exhibit less violent behaviour. This increases objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers.
- • If prolific offenders are banned from the station, the chance is greater that they will not enter the station premises. If prolific offenders do not come into the station, they do not have the opportunity to exhibit bothersome behaviour. This leads to a decreased number of incidents and to the improved objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers.

In theory, the measure could be effective provided it is combined with other measures, such as an approach targeting individuals. It is not yet clear how permanent the possible effect is (i.e. to what extent prolific offenders return to their previous behaviour).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure 7: a zero tolerance approach for violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve the objective and perceived safety of employees and passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Offenders are deterred and adapt their behaviour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The longer the period between the time the criminal offence is committed and the punishment is imposed, the less effect the punishment will have. If a violation concerning bothersome or aggressive behaviour results in a direct action (warning, fine, legal action), offenders see the consequences of their action. This leads to a change in behaviour in offenders, making them less likely to exhibit offensive behaviour in the future (specific deterrence). The objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers is thus increased.

On the basis of published research, a possible effect can be expected from the zero tolerance approach for violations when it is applied to the correct types of incidents (the ones being addressed in the measure, namely simple violations). There is as yet no hard evidence that the ASAP approach, which is part of the zero tolerance approach, leads to fewer repeat offenders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure 8: greater attention to care and assistance for troublemakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve the objective and perceived safety of staff and passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concrete measures have been drawn up to limit the nuisance caused by troublemakers in stations and trains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nuisance caused by troublemakers has been reduced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The measures that are supposed to lead to decreased nuisance from the group and hence improve public safety are currently under development. For this reason, a more detailed description of the logic behind this approach cannot be given at this time.

There is as yet no research available supporting the effectiveness of this approach, which is still under development. However, on the basis of some studies a well-reasoned, long-term approach to care and support can be expected to have a result. It has also been shown that handling confused individuals may not allow one only to reach troublemakers, but offenders of acts of violence as well.
1.2 Implementation

*What is the current status of the implementation of the eight measures?*

Three of the eight measures have been completely implemented: intensified cooperation with police, introduction of the station ban and the zero tolerance approach. The other measures are not yet (fully) implemented. That should not come as such a surprise, because the implementation of many of these measures simply requires a long preparation time. For example, the access gates and cameras need to be installed and activated with the requisite technical work and the necessary procurement procedures, and for some of the measures new staff need to be recruited, selected and trained.

For six of the eight measures the implementation has led to an accelerated introduction or the expansion of a measure that was already in effect previously or elsewhere (measures 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7). With respect to the other cases, measure 5 concerned improved cooperation, while measure 8 concerned developing measures for care and assistance for confused troublemakers (measure 8).

We have summarised the status of implementation for each individual measure (column 1). The 'implementation' column gives a summary per measure of the implementation status. For detailed information – in Dutch - we refer you to the chapters in which we discuss each of the measures at length.
Table 1.2 Overview of implementation per measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measure 1: extra support aboard the train on high-risk routes and in high-risk periods</td>
<td>Night service trains (Nachtnet) and Early Bird trains are doubly staffed. This is followed by Tues–Sat after 22:00 hrs, and then Sun-Wed are doubly staffed on a flexible basis. According to the schedule, the implementation will continue until the second quarter of 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 2a: more camera surveillance in stations</td>
<td>12 stations have temporary cameras, but by the end of 2016 (with an additional 18 stations) there will be a total of 30 stations with permanent cameras. That is apart from the 48 major stations that already have cameras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 2b: trial use of video monitors</td>
<td>A trial with monitors is being conducted in two stations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 3: camera surveillance on trains</td>
<td>28 per cent of trains have camera surveillance. About two thirds of those have cameras everywhere, while the other third has them only in the boarding areas. Trains are outfitted with cameras when they are replaced or undergo maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 4: accelerated introduction of electronic card-activated access gates</td>
<td>The introduction of card-activated access gates has been accelerated in 15 stations (an average of 8 weeks earlier than planned). Currently 57 of the approximately 400 stations (55% of traffic) have access restricted to ticketed passengers, the ultimate goal being 82 stations (93% of traffic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 5: intensified cooperation between NS and the police</td>
<td>20 area police officers have been employed. They may be deployed at 22 stations jointly designated as problem stations by NS and the police. Extra targeted man-hours have been deployed for joint actions, with NS. More information is being exchanged, and strategic, tactic and operational consultation between the police and NS takes place on a regular basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 6: accelerated introduction of station ban</td>
<td>The law went into force on 1 May 2015 (2 months earlier than planned). Of the 52 bans that have since been imposed, 49 summons have been issued. Eight of them have resulted in a court session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 7: zero tolerance approach for violations</td>
<td>This measure falls within the police’s regular zero tolerance approach and technique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 8: greater attention to care and assistance for troublemakers</td>
<td>The Ministry of Interior consulted with NS, the police and various other stakeholders concerning care and assistance for known troublemakers. Since November 2015 regular consultation has taken place between parties that include a task force on confused troublemakers and NS. These two consultations have not (yet) resulted in the drawing up of any concrete measures to limit the nuisance caused by this group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Practically all measures are nationwide or are national in scope. One exception to this is the measure for camera surveillance in stations and the trial use of video monitors. As for the measure on ‘attention to care and assistance for troublemakers’, it is not yet known whether this measure will also be introduced nationwide. A number of measures (double staffing, police deployment, camera surveillance in stations) are applied in a targeted fashion: where and/or when a problems rises action is taken.

1.3 Results

How probable is it in practice that the various measures are having or have had an effect on (perceived) personal safety?

Here we primarily examine the results of the policy analysis and the literature review. Since the measures are either been implemented only very recently or have yet to be (fully) implemented, it proves difficult to say anything definite about their possible effects on personal safety.
Only the accelerated introduction of card-activated access gates shows a result: having the gates closed correlates with a decrease in the number of fare-dodgers, and there are indications of a decrease in the number of registers incidents in the train (but an increase in incidents at stations).

- Additionally, the pilot showing real time CCTV footage on video monitors has led to a twofold increase in awareness of camera surveillance at the two pilot stations.
- The measure to ‘intensify cooperation between NS and police’ has led to an improved level of information, coordinated deployment and a greater police presence in stations.

We have summarised the results per measure (column 1) in table 13.3. In the last column (results concerning personal safety) it will be noted that for the great majority of the measures it remains to be seen whether the measure leads to the goals being met (improved personal safety). In contrast, more can often be said about the interim goals. This can be found in the middle column of the table.

The following table is again a summary. The details and precise outcomes per measure can be found in the chapters indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Initial results with respect to achieving interim goals</th>
<th>Initial results with respect to personal safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measure 1: extra support aboard the train on high-risk routes and in high-risk periods</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 2a: more camera surveillance in stations</td>
<td>140 images have been requested for the purposes of identifying suspects, but it is not known whether this has led to identification or prosecution.</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 2b: trial use of video monitors</td>
<td>Awareness of camera surveillance has almost doubled at both pilot stations.</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 3: camera surveillance on trains</td>
<td>51 images have been requested for the purposes of identifying suspects. It is not known whether this has led to identification or prosecution.</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 4: accelerated introduction of card-activated access gates</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of fare-dodgers.</td>
<td>Besides the decrease in the number of fare-dodgers there are both positive and negative effects: in stations where access gates have been ‘closed’ we see a decrease in the number of registered acts of physical aggression, coupled with an increase in theft/pickpocketing and vandalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 5: intensified cooperation between NS and the police</td>
<td>There is better information sharing and more targeted joint actions (coordination of NS and police deployment). There is a greater police presence at stations.</td>
<td>Not yet known However, the registered number of incidents of theft/pickpocketing has increased since the arrival of area police officers, possibly due to the incidents being identified and registered more quickly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 6: accelerated introduction of station ban</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 7: zero tolerance approach for violations</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure 8: care and assistance for troublemakers</td>
<td>As yet there are no concrete measures for limiting the nuisance caused by this group, other than the existing local regulations concerning shelter and assistance for confused individuals. There are many initiatives at the municipal level, but those are broad-based initiatives, not specifically designed for the context of the railway system.</td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Apart from the initial results, in addition to commenting and explaining individual measures, interviewees also expressed their opinions about the set of eight measures as a whole:

- Policy officers indicate that by approving the package of measures an important signal was given to the general public, as well as to offenders and stakeholder organisations. The package has demonstrably helped to prioritise and expedite various issues.
- The passengers’ organisation Rover has the impression that the package was created in an ad hoc fashion after the incident in Hoofddorp and that it is partially a matter of window-dressing. According to Rover, the dwindling numbers of NS staff in stations (including service window staff) is leading to a deterioration of personal safety.
- Labour unions are in principle satisfied with the package and have particularly high expectations for doubled staffing. The unions are disappointed with the time NS is taking to implement this measure.

Taking a broad view, it is improbable that the various measures will immediately have a substantial effect on personal safety. Most of the measures could in theory be effective (see literature review), provided they meet a number of conditions. The measures must also be correctly implemented (see implementation), and that has yet to be achieved for most of the measures. For measure 4, the greatest results are to be expected from the introduction of card-activated access gates, partially because published research leads us to expect such results and because this measure is practically nationwide, covering the majority of passengers. We can already see the first results from this measure (fewer fare-dodgers).

1.4 Developments in personal safety

*What developments in (perceived) public safety can be detected in the past period?*

No clear trend can be detected in the various indicators of objective safety in the period under consideration (2014–2015). There is a decrease in the number of acts of physical aggression and violence against staff (especially on trains). In this connection, we note that it was also the act of physical aggression against a conductor that initially led to the development of the package of measures. It looks like there is a decrease in the number of instances of fare-dodging. On the other hand, there also seems to be an increase in the number of incidents of verbal aggression (especially in stations), incivilities (especially on trains, particularly on the part of beggars, musicians and vagrants) and theft/pickpocketing and vandalism.

When considering these figures, one must bear in mind that a portion of the incidents go unreported and that the labour unions indicate that staff are suffering from ‘reporting fatigue’. In contrast, there also seems to be ‘heightened awareness’, which again can lead to ‘more reporting’. It is as yet unknown whether the willingness to report changed during the period under consideration.

In this period, we also see no change in (the various indicators of) either subjective or perceived safety. Passengers continue to rate safety in stations with a score of around 7. Perceived safety on the train was rated as positive by 80% of passengers in both 2014 and 2015. Staff indicate that they feel somewhat less safe on public transportation and during their work than in general. No differences were detected between the first and second measurements in 2015 and 2016.
No definite conclusion can be made at this stage concerning the effects the package of measures has had on subjective and objective safety. Research shows that the package does have the potential to contribute to improve personal safety on and around the railway.

1.5 Conclusion

Personal safety in stations and trains is an important issue that has ranked high on the political agenda for some time now. A package of eight measures was adopted on 11 March 2015 by the Ministries of Infrastructure and the Environment (IenM), Interior (BZK), and of Security and Justice (VenJ), Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), ProRail and the labour unions, following a serious incident of aggression. The package of measures aims to improve the personal safety of both NS staff and passengers.

Considering the recently initiated and as yet incomplete implementation of the package of measures, it is still too early to draw conclusions concerning the effectiveness of these measures on the basis of concrete figures. This quickscan provides a good picture of the initial results of the package of measures. However, the measures operate in concert, reinforcing each other as well as other existing measures, which makes it difficult to determine the effect of each measure individually. Additionally, the measures apply nationwide, making it impossible to compare the situation with areas where the measure has not yet been introduced.

On this basis of this quickscan we suppose that in theory the eight measures could be effective, provided that they meet a few conditions, as stated in the report, and are properly implemented. That is still not the case with many of the measures. A positive exception to this is the expedited introduction of electronic card-activated access gates. This is the measure that is expected to have the greatest effect.

To gain insight into the effects of the package of measures, it is important to continue monitoring the implementation and results of the measures.

With the adoption of the package of measures an important signal was given to the general population, offenders and stakeholder organisations. The package has demonstrably helped to prioritise and expedite various issues. The outcomes of this quickscan can make a further contribution to a targeted introduction of the package of measures and to identifying and prioritising personal safety on and around the railway. In this way the results provide leads for further policy development, contributing to efforts to address and prevent personal safety issues in stations and trains.
DSP-groep, opgericht in 1984, is een onafhankelijk landelijk bureau voor onderzoek, advies en management, met vijftig medewerkers. We werken in opdracht van overheden en maatschappelijke organisaties op regionaal, lokaal en (inter)nationaal niveau.

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