

Tables to the article

Law enforcement interventions in the Netherlands: mapping interventions and ‘browsing’ for evidence, *Evidence & Policy*, vol. 3 no. 4, 2007, pp. 487-504

Table A Methodological quality of project evaluations

Intervention (X) and desired effect (Y)	Evaluation design	Evaluation of the implementation?	Reconstruction and evaluation of policy assumptions (mechanisms, results)	MSMS (1-5) Description
Project M. Establishment of an anonymous crime reporting hotline should lead to more investigations and convictions.	*Inventory and process description of reports in 5 police districts during the first 8 months of the project. *Media analysis of approx. 300 articles *Selection among population for interviews (before and after) with regard to attitudes and perception of M.	Yes.	Description of the functioning of a tight process: from communication to reports, to processing and use of reports. (Effects can hereby be accredited to the policy with more certainty.)	Level 2 Baseline measurement and intermediate measurement available. No control conditions.
NOVO team for war crimes expected to lead to investigation, intermediation, and evidence gathering.	Intermediate evaluation of effects, using document research and interviews. Examination of the conditions under which NOVO has operated: *Context analysis *Internal analysis *Triangulation and report.	Yes.	Description of the working mechanisms, with a comparison between intended and executed tasks.	Level 2 Baseline measurement and intermediate measurement available. No control conditions.
Special Investigation Squads were to handle and solve more complex and large-scale cases.	Descriptive study of the ‘added value’ of the Special Investigation Squads *Desk research *Interviews in all 7 Special Investigation Squads with officials and (only 8 per team) surveys among all employees.	Yes.	No reflection on principal policy mechanisms, but focus on implementation process and organisation.	Level 1 No baseline measurement. This is not explicitly justified. No control conditions. <i>De facto</i> , this is a study on goal achievement. Lack of some types of information generally well grounded.

Table A (continued)

<p>Financial Investigation (FI): training and communication between chain partners (police, Public Prosecutor) expected to lead to acceptance, integration and implementation of financial investigation, in order to fight organised crime and fraud.</p>	<p>Research on the extent of implementation after 5 years, the main indicator being the integration of FIs in the enforcement chain. <i>*Qualitative:</i> Interviews (N=155), surveys (N=833), brainstorming, document research <i>*Quantitative:</i> COMPAS data, Interregional fraud team (hereinafter IFT) registry, Prosecution Services Criminal Assets Deprivation Bureau (hereinafter BOOM), the Dutch Central Judicial Agency (hereinafter CJIB). For the evaluation of training, a sample survey was held. Not representative for police districts and Public Prosecutors' Offices.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>No explicit evaluation of intended policy mechanisms.</p>	<p>Level 1 No baseline measurement. No control conditions. FI is the only project on this issue, hence some results can be ascribed to the FI project with some certainty.</p>
<p>Intervention (X) and desired effect (Y)</p>	<p>Evaluation design</p>	<p>Evaluation of the implementation?</p>	<p>Reconstruction and evaluation of policy assumptions</p>	<p>MSMS (1-5) Description</p>
<p>The 'Hektor' project was intended to reduce drug-related nuisance in Venlo by means of multiple interventions.</p>	<p>*Collection of details from police, tax dept., Public Prosecutor registries *Interviews with proprietors *Assessment drug-related nuisance among population *Scheduled observations by civic guards.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Description of the expected action plan and results, indicators were based on this. No feedback to policy assumptions.</p>	<p>Level 2 Baseline measurement, intermediate measurement and end measurement. No control conditions.</p>
<p>'Co-operation against XTC' was intended to reduce XTC production and trade both within and outside the Netherlands.</p>	<p>*Indicators were inventoried for measurement of input, co-operation, and results *The indicators were screened for validity and availability *59 indicators were picked for the first measurements (intended input, processes, output and outcome)</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Description of assumptions. Measurement indicators have been based on this. Feedback from the findings to the assumptions.</p>	<p>Level 2 Baseline measurement, intermediate measurements and end measurements. No control conditions.</p>

	*Details from registration systems of actors involved *Written questionnaires on co-operation			
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Table B Methodological quality of one organisation evaluation

Intervention (X) and desired effect (Y)	Evaluation design	Evaluation of the implementation?	Reconstruction and evaluation of policy assumptions	MSMS (1-5) Description
Public Prosecutor's influence on the nature and scale of reports concerning environmental offences.	*Time series analysis (SPSS) of number of reports (desk) *4 case studies with interviews (background research).	Yes.	The actual working was examined using reports and interviews. However, no feedback to the key policy mechanisms.	Level 1 In-depth study of possible factors that determine the Public Prosecutor's degree of power.

Table C Methodological quality of research on law enforcement chain

Intervention (X) and desired effect (Y)	Evaluation design	Evaluation of implementation ?	Reconstruction and evaluation of policy assumptions	MSMS (1-5) Description
Enforcement in rural areas: description of the working of existing enforcement structures (regulation, supervision, investigation, and sanctions) for the benefit of the environment.	'Quick-scan' monitor research: *Exploratory talks with stakeholders *Desk research Overview per field of: *Legislation and regulations *Supervision and investigation *Sanctioning.	Yes.	Description of relevant policy objectives, organisations involved, regulations, and implementation procedures per field. No feedback to the central policy mechanism, but inventory of bottlenecks.	Level 1 Research aimed at stock-taking of <i>bottlenecks</i> in enforcement. Global description of degree of enforcement. No baseline measurement, no control conditions.
'State of law enforcement by municipalities'. Current enforcement practice in municipalities.	*Qualitative descriptive research of 13 average municipalities to draw up uniform performance figure *Interviews with public officials *Desk research *External validity is deficient	Yes.	Central working mechanisms were not explicitly examined; however, enforcement deficiencies were illustrated.	Level 1 Research regarding existing organisational practices. No baseline measurements, no control conditions.
Enforcement of waste legislation. Organisation of public waste management, compliance with environmental legislation.	All services involved were investigated; also sample surveys of municipalities. *Interviews with stakeholders *Document study *Workshop *In-depth investigation (three sub streams).	Yes.	The policy principles were repeated. No explicit feedback to the central policy mechanisms; however, bottlenecks are inventoried.	Level 1 No baseline measurements, no control conditions. No effectiveness study; the objective was rather to take stock of bottlenecks, with a view towards a new strategic plan.
'Towards reasonable processing times in the criminal law chain': investigation of the time efficiency of the entire enforcement chain (processing times).	*Interviews with police, public prosecutor, the judiciary (sitting magistrate), rehabilitation, Commission for Legal Aid (CJB) etc. *Basic figures *Outline of processing times and theoretically relevant factors. Combined with interviews on the possibility of reasonable processing periods.	Yes.	The course of proceedings in the criminal law chain (policy) was reconstructed, enabling evaluation of time efficiency.	Level 1 No baseline measurement, no control conditions. The study emphasises the importance of examining efficiency problems.

Table C (continued)

<p>Integral enforcement: more co-ordinated enforcement by various actors expected to lead to more efficiency, professionalism, legality etc.</p>	<p>*Desk study: description of situation in 'progressive'-municipalities (best practices) *Subsequently, in-depth research of actual practice in a selection of municipalities, through interviews with enforcement officers and expert meetings *Subsequently, an assessment of four enforcement scenarios, based on the actual situation.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>No explicit link with the central policy mechanisms; however, conditions were drawn up under which integrated enforcement can either succeed or fail.</p>	<p>Level 1 No baseline measurement, no control conditions. Inventory of 'best practices' in municipal enforcement chains.</p>
<p>Chain of unusual transactions. Organisation of processing, investigation and prosecution of unusual transactions expected to lead to more investigation and prosecutions.</p>	<p>*Forward and backward tracking and experiments *Sample survey- (limited) scope well accounted for *(Group) interviews *Document research *Use of existing data files.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Central policy mechanisms were mentioned and controlled for in actual practice. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear policy goal hampered evaluation clarity. Bottlenecks in the implementation and working of the policy were outlined.</p>	<p>Level 1 No baseline measurement, no control conditions.</p>
<p>Enforcement of the Compulsory Education Act by mobilising local partners.</p>	<p>Combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach. Research held during the development of a pilot: *Document study *Surveys (3) in education and among management.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Intended mechanisms behind policy were examined and actual bottlenecks were systematically described.</p>	<p>Level 2 Baseline measurement and intermediate measurements, including process descriptions.</p>

Table D Methodological quality of research on legislation and regulations

Intervention (X) and desired effect (Y)	Evaluation design	Evaluation of implementation?	Reconstruction and evaluation of policy assumptions	MSMS (1-5) Description
<p>DNA profiling in investigation and evidence in criminal procedures - baseline measurement. Amendment to the Act (Nov. 2001) for wider use of DNA profiling (e.g. buccal swab DNA collection method, inquests in lesser crimes) was expected to lead to more use of DNA research and a higher crime solving percentage.</p>	<p>Small sample survey of records chosen representatively: *Analysis of databases of public prosecutors and registries in 4 regions in 1999 *Analysis of DNA records (Dutch Forensic Institute, Dutch acronym NFI) *Interviews with actors *Analysis of national data on criminal cases.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>*Detailed analysis and comparison of old and new legislation *Indicators specified *No feedback to expected working mechanisms: the study is a baseline measurement.</p>	<p>Level 2 The study is a baseline measurement of the extent of the use of DNA profiling in investigations.</p>
<p>'Nature and extent of trafficking in doping agents and development of indicators' regarding transfer of trafficking in doping agents to the Economic Crimes Act (Dutch acronym WED). This was expected to reduce trade and production of doping agents.</p>	<p>Quick scan research: *Interviews with 61 key informants in gyms *Screening of the Internet as an important trade location.</p>	<p>No.</p>	<p>Evaluation indicators were based on a summary description of the intended mechanisms. No feedback to these intended mechanisms yet: the study in itself is a baseline measurement.</p>	<p>Level 2 Study on current position of production and trafficking. The study is a baseline measurement for future effect research; no control conditions.</p>
<p>Use and purchase of cannabis by 16 and 17 year olds. Raising of the minimum legal age from 16 to 18 expected to lead to lower sales and use of cannabis among 16 and 17 year olds.</p>	<p>Quick literature scan and secondary analysis of data from surveys and registry of care and treatment centres for drug addicts. The study yielded a nationwide picture; the quality of figures is good.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Shortcomings in the policy were revealed by comparing intended with actual events.</p>	<p>Level 1 One-off study in which the relationship between the raised age limit and outcome variables was examined.</p>
<p>Effects of the repeal of the ban on brothels. Sharp distinction between legal and illegal forms of exploitation of prostitution was expected to lead to A) restructuring of the prostitution sector B) more forceful action against</p>	<p>6 sub studies, each with a different design. General: interviews with various parties concerned (prostitutes, exploiters, key informants, commercial services, social services municipal services, police, tax dept., the Dutch</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Partial feedback to policy assumptions by taking stock of actual bottlenecks.</p>	<p>Level 1 No baseline measurements or control conditions. The absence of baseline measurement is partly accounted for.</p>

exploitation and sexual abuse of minors.	governments' social security agency (UWV) and the Dutch population).			
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Table D (continued)

<p>Implementation of the Settlement of Environmental Offences Act (TbM) means a more complete set of enforcement instruments, which was expected to lead to increased effectiveness and efficiency of enforcement and, eventually, compliance.</p>	<p>Monitoring system with baseline measurement, intermediate measurement and final measurement. Only applied to 'pilots': *Interviews *Figures.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>The actual working of the specified policy mechanism was examined, increasing the internal validity.</p>	<p>Level 2 Baseline and intermediate measurements. No control conditions.</p>
<p>Intervention (X) and desired effect (Y)</p>	<p>Evaluation design</p>	<p>Evaluation of the implementation?</p>	<p>Reconstruction and evaluation of policy assumptions</p>	<p>MSMS (1-5) Description</p>
<p>Special Investigatory Powers Act (Dutch acronym BOB) - phase 1: Codification of special investigatory powers with Public Prosecutors, including a clear division of competences was expected to lead to: A) elimination of reliability and integrity risks of investigations and B) investigation of violation of constitutional and civil rights.</p>	<p>Background, implementation, and expectations of the law are described *Literature research: lower regulations and parliamentary documents, recommendations, scientific literature. *Interviews (45) with fairly experienced enforcement officers (particularly police and public prosecutor) in 3 regions (first half 2001). Accountable research design.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>The findings (particularly regarding implementation) were fed back to the three main objectives of the BOB Act.</p>	<p>Level 1 Incomplete baseline measurement, no control conditions. First phase of research on preliminary objective achievement. Final evaluation was done at a later point in time (publication: end of 2004)</p>
<p>Preliminary Judicial Investigation Provisions Act. Shift in powers and duties to public prosecutor (streamlining); adjustment of regulation regarding search & seizure. The desired effect was not specifically stipulated.</p>	<p>Desk study (history of the legislation, jurisprudence) and interviews in 3 district courts. Well-based design.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>According to the authors the inadequate and interim information 'do not allow for reflections on underlying decisions in the Act'.</p>	<p>Level 1 Research on the first phase of objective achievement. No baseline measurement (this is accounted for), no control conditions. Effects were difficult to measure due to the fluctuation in actual practice (legislation, jurisprudence).</p>

Table D (continued)

<p>Enforceability of the Fertiliser Act. Tax on fertilisers (minerals); fertiliser sales agreements and fluctuating EU policy expected to lead to reduction of fertiliser dumping.</p>	<p>Compliance behaviour: *Literature study e.g. General Inspection Service (Dutch acronym AID), public prosecutor *Fraud sensitivity analysis *Interviews with target groups using 'randomised response' technique (anonymous) *This self report is compared to findings from external inspections. *Sample survey (-framework) is unclear. *Feedback loop to the 'Eleven-times Table'.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Description of the various steps in law enforcement (response, report, warnings, sanctions). Systematic policy bottlenecks have been inventoried by using the 'Eleven-times Table' (a specification of 11 steps believed to be made before oversight, inspection and compliance can be effective).</p>	<p>Level 1 Description of state of affairs regarding law enforcement. (Therefore) no baseline measurement, no control conditions.</p>
<p>Observance to the Water Pollution Act: Dumping restrictions through *permits *measurements *taxes *sanctions on over-dumping or failure to report expected to lead to compliance and reduction of dumping in water.</p>	<p>Compliance behaviour: *Desk study on enforcement activities *Interviews with target group using 'randomised response' (anonymous). *This self report was compared with findings from external inspections *Investigation among experts on bottlenecks in compliance and enforcement *Sample survey(-framework) is unclear *Feedback loop to the 'Eleven-times Table'.</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	<p>Description of the various steps in the enforcement procedure (response, report, warnings, sanctions). Systematic policy bottlenecks have been inventoried by using the Eleven-times Table.</p>	<p>Level 1 Description of state of affairs regarding law enforcement. No baseline measurement, no control conditions.</p>

Table E Overview of project evaluations: intervention(s) and desired effects, assumed mechanisms, findings regarding mechanisms and other factors, results

Projects	Intervention(s) and en desired effects	Assumed mechanisms	Actual working of mechanisms; other factors	Results
Project 'M.' (Report Crime Anonymously).	Establishment of an anonymous crime reporting hotline expected to lead to more investigations and prosecutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Communication 'M' *Citizens aware of existence of hotline *Attitudes *Intention to act → behavior among citizens *Front office: hotline *Back office: processing of useful reports *Results: investigations, prosecutions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Bottleneck in the back offices' decision power *Which <i>types</i> of offences have been reported turned out to be more easy to control. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Front office, 2,000 calls *Public opinion positive *6 to 9% investigated *1-2% apprehension *No long term effects available yet.
Evaluation NOVO team war crimes.	The NOVO team was set up for investigating war crimes, intermediating, and gathering evidence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Reporting *Gathering evidence *Interrogation *Institutional affiliation with chain partners *Despatches. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Nature of cases is problematic due to burden of proof *Good quality of NOVO team *Low priority for chain partners. 	The NOVO team has not generated new apprehensions.
Evaluation of Special Investigation Squads.	Establishment of specialised investigation teams expected to lead to more, more complex, and larger-scale investigations.	Expertise and manpower combined in special teams.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Much variation between Special Investigation Squads *Lack of strategic nationwide management *Low-profile proves beneficial for complexity, expertise, coherence and continuity *Staff insufficiently trained *Special Investigation Squads vital for communication interchange. 	No clear conclusions possible on the added value of the Special Investigation Squads.

Table E (continued)

Projects (cont.)	Intervention(s) and en desired effects	Assumed mechanisms	Actual working of mechanisms; other factors	Results
Financial Investigation (FI).	Training and communication between chain partners (police, Public Prosecutor) expected to lead to acceptance, integration, and implementation of financial investigation. For fighting organised crime and fraud.	<i>Sub-objectives:</i> *Advice on management & organisation *Improvement of communication *Training *Development of methods *Amendments to legislation *Development of preventive measures.	*Objective unclear and ambitious *Offenders unaware of the seriousness of their crime *Insufficient cases *Lack of management.	*FI was put on the agenda of the police and the Public Prosecutor *Integrated among specialists, but not in the average police district.
Project 'Hektor' to fight drug-related nuisance in Venlo.	Reduce drug-related nuisance by means of a multimodal approach.	*Intensifying law enforcement: increased input of staff and means (increase of chance of being caught) *Approach to drug-related real estate *Amendment of coffee shop policy.	*Increase of effort and 'output' (e.g. arrests) by services involved *Amendment of coffee shop policy was not yet realised at the time of intermediate measurement.	*Nuisance and crime at the time of intermediate measurement not reduced *Registered drug-related real estate, dealers, and runners decreased *Higher sense of safety and more economic activity.
Evaluation the XTC policy (document).	Reduction of production and trafficking XTC within and outside the Netherlands.	*Harder line against XTC: increased input of staff and means (enhancing the chance of arrest) *Plan of action regarding precursors and appliances, production locations and trade.	Initial results in the desired direction: *Increase in effort and 'output' (e.g. dismantlement) by services involved *The information position of Customs and Economic Inspection Service of the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (Dutch acronym FIOD/ECD) has improved *The co-operation of investigation and inspection services has intensified.	*More seizures during the first year of implementation *More production locations dismantled *Less dumping *No further results (baseline measurement only).

Table F Overview of chain evaluations: intervention(s) and desired effects, assumed mechanisms, findings regarding mechanisms and other factors, results

Law enforcement chain	Interventions and desired effects	Assumed mechanisms	Actual working of mechanisms; other factors	Results
Law enforcement rural area.	Existing law enforcement structures: legislation, supervision and investigation, sanctions for the benefit of the environment.	Extremely broad, includes e.g. regulation through permits, and inspection and detection probability.	*Lack of management *Shortage of enforcement capacity *Lack of priority.	Law enforcement inadequate in general.
State of law enforcement municipalities.	Current enforcement policies in municipalities and the observance thereof.	Effects of do's and don'ts.	*Shortage of capacity (staff) *Lack of values, high tolerance.	Compliance below standard.
Waste regulation.	Organisation of national waste management, observance of environmental legislation.	*Policy outline *Vertical link with administrative body *Minimum standard *Integral control *Permit system and sanctions.	*Inadequate co-operation and co-ordination *Lack of knowledge and capacity *Lack of trust *Lack of values *More international orientation required *More financial stimuli.	Law enforcement system inadequate.
Processing times in the criminal justice chain.	Concerns the entire law enforcement chain. Efficiency of law enforcement is reflected in processing times.	Process model: *Investigation by police *Prosecution by Public Prosecutor *Adjudication by courts *Enforcement by Public Prosecutor.	The following aspects in the chain need improvement: *Co-ordination *Better alignment of sub processes *Co-operation with external partners.	Processing times needed shortening with an average of 6,7 months.
Integral enforcement.	A more co-ordinated enforcement by various actors leads to more: efficiency, professionalism, legality, etc.:	Unite chain in 'a consistent whole'. Also co-ordination and co-operation.	Enforcement is hampered by differences in: *styles *procedures *policy cycles	Co-ordination between bodies within municipalities already existed. Hence, the policy effort did not appear to be a necessary condition.

Table F (continued)

Chain 'Unusual Transactions'	The special organisation of the processing, tracing and prosecution of unusual transactions ought to enhance the number of tracings and prosecutions.	Proaction, prevention, detection (pre-)conversion, intake and weighting, investigation.	*Too much focus on crime fighting, too little on prevention and knowledge accumulation. *Too much focus on the chain rather than integral management *Lack of judicial orientation and management. *Reportings were deficient or lack utility.	*The number of reportings increased; however, it was difficult to monitor the impact on tracings *Unusual transactions had not become well embedded in the existing chain structure.
Compulsory Education Act	Implementation and enforcement of the Compulsory Education Act with the assistance of local partners.	*Increased registration of non-attendance *Good co-operation between partners.	*Enhanced co-operation with local partners *However, municipalities' role was deficient	Registration of non-attendance had increased by 56-60% on a yearly basis.

Table G Overview of evaluations of legislation and regulations: intervention(s) and desired effects, assumed mechanisms, findings regarding mechanisms and other factors, results.

Legislation and/ or regulations	Intervention(s) and desired effects	Assumed mechanisms	Actual working of mechanisms; other factors	Results
DNA profiling in investigation and evidence in criminal trials, baseline measurements.	Law amendment (November 2001) for wider use of criminal DNA research (e.g. buccal swab DNA collection method, inquests in smaller crimes) expected to lead to more use of DNA profiling and to a higher percentage of crime solving.	Broader application and expertise increase the use of criminal DNA research.	*DNA profiling method was already applied in investigation since 1999 *Police found it difficult to apply DNA profiling structurally *No further details known (only baseline measurement).	*DNA profiling was already applied *No information on end effects (solved crimes) as of yet; only baseline measurement available.
Nature and scale of trafficking in doping agents and development of indicators.	Law amendment (May 2001) transfers trafficking of tolerated drugs to Economic Offences Act (Dutch acronym WED). This would reduce trafficking and production of drug agents.	More competences for dealing with and fighting drugs expected to reduce trafficking and production of doping agents.	None yet known (only baseline measurement).	*No information on end effects *Prior to the law amendment, trafficking and use seemed to have increased.
Use and purchase of cannabis by 16 and 17 year olds.	Amendment coffee shop criteria (1996): raising minimum age for cannabis purchase from 16 to 18. This was expected to reduce the purchase and use of cannabis among 16 and 17 year olds.	*By banning teenagers 16-17 years old from coffee shops, the threshold for drug use was to be raised.	*16 and 17 year olds were not always barred from coffee shops *Young people found ways to come by drugs.	*Drug use among 16 and 17 year olds stabilised *Coffee shops were still sales outlet, but now via older friends or acquaintances.
Lifting the ban on brothels: consequences.	The lifting of the ban on brothels was expected to lead to the possibility to: A) restructure the prostitution branch and B) implement a more forceful action plan against exploitation; sexual abuse of minors.	*Distinction between legal and illegal forms of exploitation of prostitution facilitates control and regulation *Municipalities play a central role here.	*Active municipalities proved to be a prerequisite for success *Tenacity (culture) slowed the regulation process down *Combination of increase in (ICT) mobility and divergent municipal policy lead to multiformity of prostitution *Enforcement level (municipality) did not fit the national and international character of prostitution.	*No effects could be measured as yet *Larger multiformity of prostitution *Shifts (local, more forms such as escort, Internet) *Backlog in permit distribution and communication with prostitutes *Final evaluation in 2005.

Table G (continued)

Implementation of the Settlement of Environmental Offences Act (TbM).	Implementation TbM: a more complete set of enforcement instruments expected to increase effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement, and eventually law abidance.	Extension of the enforcement instruments of administrative bodies.	*Support *Capacity *The earlier implementation of a tit-for-tat policy.	*Objective was achieved to a large degree *More complete set of law enforcement instruments *More co-operation *More attention for law enforcement *Compliance not observable.
First evaluation of the 'Special Powers of the Criminal Investigation Act' (BOB- 1).	Combination of codification of special powers of criminal investigation with the Public Prosecutor as main actor and clear division of powers expected to lead to: A) elimination of threats to the reliability and integrity of investigations and B) investigation of violation of civil rights/ constitution.	*Reliable and transparent investigation decisions *More facilities for investigation *Legal settlement of criminal cases.	*The BOB law was already anticipated before its implementation *Unaccustomed with new legislation, hesitant use of new powers *Administrative preconditions were realised too late, mistakes were made.	*Nothing mentioned about effects *Use of new competences limited *Final evaluation completed end of 2004.
Preliminary Judicial Investigation Provisions Act	Shift in competences and duties to the Public Prosecutor (streamlining); and amendment to search and seizure regulations expected to eventually lead to improved investigation results.	*General: streamlining inquests, in order to improve investigations (efficiency) *Extension of powers.	*Acceptance of changes *Implementation appeared to be successful.	*No end effects noticeable yet *Workload seemed the same.
Compliance to the Fertiliser Act.	*Fertiliser levies *Fertiliser sale agreements and *Fluctuating EU policy expected to lead to reduction of mineral dumping.	*Detection chance, and penalty size played a role in non-compliance to law *Levies on dumping through declaration system *In fertiliser sale agreements a link is made between production and market.	Positive effects: *Sense of responsibility was large *Large detection chance during inspections: costs of law violation high. Negative effects: *Small chance of inspection *Costs of compliance were high.	Enforcement expected to discourage potential offenders. *5-21% had inaccurate declaration *5-9% had inaccurate bookkeeping *24-31% violated the rules of the Minerals reporting System *9% was deliberately in violation *Expert estimations showed much higher violation percentages than the target groups themselves did.

Table G (continued)

<p>Compliance to the Water Pollution Act.</p>	<p>Dumping restrictions through (Water Pollution Act): *Permits *Measurements *Levies *Sanctions on over-dumping or failing to report expected to lead to reduction of dumping (by making them controllable and enforceable) = compliance Water Pollution Act (Dutch acronym WVO).</p>	<p>*Levies (= costs) dumping *Inspection and sanction mechanisms to increase chance of discovery and severity of penalty * Fines for neglecting to declare.</p>	<p>*Low chance of detection and discovery *Big disadvantages to observing law (vs. low advantages) *Company size and district seemed to increase the number of violations and the chance of detection, respectively. <i>Ad hoc:</i> There were bottlenecks in the enforcement, such as insufficient knowledge of regulations among target group, weak system, insufficient adherence to permits, slow response to offences.</p>	<p>Enforcement expected to discourage 66% of potential offenders. Compliance to law is limited: *64% perpetrators of reported permit *35% Water Pollution Act (Dutch acronym WVO) perpetrators. Self reports proved 'rosier' than findings from external inspections.</p>
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